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What have we learned since 1989?
1 
Charles S. Maier 
 
 
What have we learned since 1989?  The harsher version of the question might be 
what did historians and social scientists get wrong about 1989?  Two quick answers have 
circulated since that historical moment.  The first alleged error was a failure of 
democratic faith before the events of 1989-91.  That is, social scientists failed to foresee 
the collapse of the Communist Party regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 
contrast to many writers, artists, and local activists, they did not take account of the 
economic, political, and moral vulnerabilities of the system. The second alleged error 
sprang from an excess of democratic faith after the communist collapse. That is, many 
commentators then envisaged that democratization would become irreversible throughout 
most of the world sooner or later – the so-called “end of history.”  I will return to those 
issues, but in this essay, I want primarily to address the transformations themselves and 
not just our failure to predict them or the so-called triumphalism that followed.   
 
Let’s stick with the less reproachful question: what have we learned about the 
transformations of l989 in the last twenty years?  Many journalists at the time and 
academic commentators in the two decades since have provided illuminating accounts of 
the complex processes that were unfolding.  They have revealed ambiguous 
developments, false starts, and the fragility of progress.  But a question still persists: in 
what way might we have we misunderstood 1989?  In particular, did some of us at least 
invest the democratization of communist Europe with a greater epochal significance than 
it seems to have twenty years later?  Did we become intoxicated on history and lose our 
scholarly cool?  Were we personally too invested in the transformations we followed day 
to day, perhaps like parents in their children’s achievements.  Probably it’s fairer or more 
sensible to ask, do we see 1989 differently now from the way we saw it then -- each as a 
younger observer, or perhaps in some cases as a participant, almost twenty years ago?  I 
pose the question not primarily to learn about our collective psychological biographies, 
but to think anew about the events that had such meaning for us.   
 
Events that appear as radical breaks, caesuras, ruptures, revolutions – the 
punctuations of “punctuated equilibrium” -- leave behind dramatic impressions that call 
for immediate interpretation as well as explanation.  That is, historians feel the urge not 
only to account for why they occurred, but to contextualize them quickly in a structure of 
meanings and assign their epochal significance.  Certainly there were many efforts to 
suggest an underlying meaning or overarching metanarrative to the events of 1989.  For 
Timothy Garton Ash, reporting from Gdansk and Prague, the events he described as 
“refolution,” meant also the revival of Central Europe.  For Samuel Huntington, they 
comprised the third wave of democratization.  For many West Germans who found it 
hard to credit the activism of their “once and future” countrymen, a mere “implosion”;   2 
for those atune to political theory, the triumph of civil society; and, of course for Francis 
Fukuyama the notorious (but also frequently misunderstood) end of history.
2   
 
Somehow almost two decades later, it seems more difficult or less urgent to 
interpret the changes of 1989 in a world-historical conjuncture. Twenty years is not really 
a long time, yet given the life cycle of adult historians, it can allow for radically changed 
subjective impressions and judgments. Certainly it is sufficient to produce a major sense 
of distancing from events that seemed to exert such a great transformative impact, the 
process akin to what Roland Barthes calls “fading” in his Lover’s Dictionary, a sense not 
of disillusion with the former experience or object of love, but disappointment that 
remembered intensity retreats so rapidly.  Now the evaporation of euphoria is hardly 
unprecedented in world history.  The endorphins stimulated by historical renewal tend to 
lose their impact after a decade, the trajectory from Bastille to Brumaire.  Events from 
1917 to 1919 in Central Europe appeared to many as the dawn of a new age, but by the 
l930s the promise of that new beginning had dissipated.  The progress of everyday 
politics, the fact that old and often opportunistic political administrators could make their 
way in the new regimes,  the fact that descendants of the Communist parties seem so 
effortlessly to have morphed into “social democratic” parties that hold power every 
alternative legislative period  --  all this has tended to take the bloom off the events.  
“Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,” but why did bliss become so impossible to 
sustain?   Events that promised a unique emancipation seem to have delivered workaday 
progress at best and often shabby politics, Charles Péguy’s declension from mystique to 
politique.
3   
 
It might be objected that such “fading” is a problem of memory, not history.  
History is an analytical and evocative procedure designed in part to counteract the 
continual reprocessing of memory.  But the issues hang together.  Our emotional stance 
conditions our analysis.  In what follows, I want to consider first the general problem of 
perceived historical “letdown” and then some of the prevailing analyses of why the 
system collapsed, and what sort of system it was. These are different issues, but 
considering them together may advance what I will take up in conclusion, namely how to 
resume writing the history of these events.   
 
Two words of warning, however – like the small print on drugstore medications.  
The first is that my discussion is based primarily on the society I know best: the former 
German Democratic Republic.  The GDR, of course, was a special component of the 
Soviet sphere, since despite all denials always remained potentially a fragment of a 
German national unit.  And the internal patterns of rule in East Germany inherited 
qualities from earlier German administrative styles, including Prussian and Saxon.  
Perhaps Czechoslovakia, with the long Bohemian subjugation to imperial Austria, 
remained the most similar in the unarticulated styles of authority that pervaded its 
politics.  Each state unit of the Soviet empire, of course, had its individual history.  In 
1989, Eastern Europe could return to diversity, to borrow Joseph Rothschild’s phrase,  
but even under communist “wraps,” so to speak, much diversity continued: Ottoman 
traces in southeast Europe and Romania, a mix of  intellectual pride and peasant Catholic   3 
traditionalism in Poland, etc.  What follows, therefore, relies on generalization that  
necessarily obscure nuance, or on my own familiarity with the East German case.   
 
Just as problematic – to provide my second word of warning -- what follows was 
drafted before the extraordinary financial and economic implosion of the last year or so. 
The crisis that Eastern Europe in particular, but perhaps all the industrial economies now 
face, may well produce harsh political outcomes we cannot foresee; and this essay might 
then appear as itself a false reading, premised on a comparatively halcyon interlude.  As 
the old Marxist joke had it, the past is very hard to predict.  
 
Letdown? 
 
Of course, some of the disillusion twenty years after 1989 has been unmerited.  
Historians often chip away at the drama of events, try to wear them down from historical 
Himalayas to mere Appalachians, in any case must see them in different lights as years 
pass.  Moreover, by most standards the transformations of l989-90 have been 
extraordinarily successful.  East Central Europe is a region of democratic states – and 
until the contemporary depression -- largely enjoying robust growth.  There has been no 
politics of revenge or blood letting.  For a region that had known so many political 
disasters before, the transition to pluralist regimes has been remarkably successful.  It is 
the trajectory within Putin’s Russia itself which raises most questions about what has 
been achieved.  The Gorbachev-Yeltsin reforms may have dismantled communism, but 
the far longer legacy of bureaucratic state-building appears to have remained powerful 
underneath.  Still, there is no final word to history and even long traditions can crumble.  
Finally much of the somberness that we associated with today’s global politics derives 
not at all from events in east Central Europe. It arises from the overshadowing of western 
politics by themes of violence and terror that have become so acute since 2001 but have 
emerged from regions outside Europe.  I think it inappropriate to lament the aftermath of 
1989, which for all its falling short of abstract ideals has yet led to a set of far less 
oppressive institutions and far fairer opportunities for so many citizens. 
 
Nevertheless, it is fruitless to lecture voters or intellectuals or students that they 
should not experience some degree of disappointment.  Two analyses (and probably 
many others as well), proposed before 1989 and thus without reference those events, help 
us think about post-1989 disillusion.  One is that formulated by the late Victor Turner, 
who in numerous writings argued that although our lives usually proceed within stable 
structures and expectations, periodically we experience episodes of transcendence or 
ecstasy or mystical communion created through religious rites of passage.  For Turner it 
was obvious wisdom that moments of exstasis – standing outside oneself – could not last. 
They were by definition brief interludes between longer moments of stability – moments 
of “antistructure” punctuating long-term structures, whether political or religious.  Turner 
certainly did not originate this contrast.  It can be extracted earlier from one of 
sociology’s founders, Emile Durkheim, who described states of collective 
“effervescence,” social integration, and “anomie.”
4  From Turner’s type of perspective, 
the exhilaration of l989 might be viewed as a powerful and intoxicating episode, but like 
earlier political upheavals had to remain just an episode.  In fact, episodes of antistructure   4 
ultimately strengthen or facilitate the continuing structures by renewing commitment or 
ventilating energies.  In that sense Turner described a particular form of ritual, and not 
revolution.  Still, Turner persuasively describeds the psychology of transitional 
emancipation, and the fall back into ordinary life.  Moreover, although his own analysis 
tends to take structure as unchanging, it does not preclude that the institutions which are 
renegotiated after an interval of liberation can be themselves transformed and renewed. 
 
Albert Hirschman has provided a second, somewhat related but distinct analysis.  
For Hirschman, an economist who finds the principle of diminishing returns second-
nature, any political or economic orientation must bring with it disappointment.  He cites 
Kant (via citations from Joseph Frank citing Karamazin): “Give a man everything he 
desires and yet at this very moment he will feel that this everything is not everything.”
5  
For Hirschman this means that as participants in society we are condemned to a 
continuing cycle of engagement with public causes and thereafter private satisfactions, 
each quest yielding disappointment in its turn. This analysis complements his celebrated 
discussion of “exit, voice, and loyalty,” but stipulates cyclical behavior and does not 
outline strategic alternatives. 
 
Insofar as both Turner and Hirschman envisaged recurrent and at least partially 
cyclical process, their insights take us only so far.  Although experiences of intense 
public involvement and subsequent disillusion (or antistructure and structure) recur in 
general, each is specific, and for individual participants (or historians) they may occur 
only once in a generation or even a lifetime.  What may be cyclical for the species is 
experienced as a one-way loss of public energy, a sort of historical entropy.  Still, our 
problems as historians should not arise just from our own personal sense of 
disappointment or “fading.”  Historians have had to reckon with a lot of disappointing 
outcomes – the aftermath of the American Civil War in terms of American race relations, 
or the inability to exclude former Nazis and fascists from postwar politics.  No group 
should understand better than historians that institutions, habits, and personal connections 
usually trump efforts to mete out justice for sleazy or even cruel past behavior.  Whence, 
then, our sense of dissatisfaction as historians?  In what follows, I will be referring 
usually to the history of the end of the German Democratic Republic; it is the experience 
I researched and followed most closely. Occasionally I refer more generally about the 
Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, subject, of course, to correction from those who 
know these societies and political systems far better than I do.  In either case, it seems we 
as historians have confronted particular sorts of explanatory and interpretive problems 
with respect to 1989.  The effective collapse of Communist power or state socialism 
raised and continues to raise three difficult sorts of issues.  
 
The first set revolves around motivation – not the motivation of the interwar, 
wartime, and early postwar period that had led many intellectuals or political actors on 
the left to become Communist to begin with and to accept its discipline, but rather the 
reasons that persuaded their successors in the late 1980s to relinquish power with 
relatively little resistance.  Why did authoritarian regimes effectively dissolve themselves 
without bloodshed?   
   5 
The question of why and how Communist systems could attract adherents and 
leaders seemed particularly urgent during the early Cold War.  The answers provided 
focused on how individual conviction became attracted to a disciplined and apparently 
powerful movement.
6  Individual biographies were ransacked for the answers. The 
question why loyalties failed in l989 focused less on individual conviction or the energy 
of the movement then on the failings and costs of a system long in power. Addressing 
this question presupposed a prior inquiry: what new challenges had arisen in the 
“objective” world that led to such devastating reassessments of the costs and benefits of 
maintaining the institutions of state socialism?  
 
A second issue exercised scholars and commentators throughout the l980s and has 
hung around ever since.  What sort of system did communist rule represent?  This is an 
issue of typology and analogy. Historians claim that a concern with typology separates 
the political scientists and sociologists from their own discipline.  In fact, even the most 
narrative-based account of supposedly singular phenomena cannot advance without 
typology, analog searching, and comparison.  “What was it like?” remains a fundamental 
query whose answer often serves stands as a response to such questions as, “What was 
it?” or “How did it function?”  “What was/is it like?” is an inquiry that helps rescue us 
from unanswerable ontological issues and allows us to work with social and historical 
analysis.  But the “it” usually prompts two divergent approaches.  The first is a state or 
regime-centered analysis that elevates politics and “rule” (Herrschaft with its 
encompassing notions of authority) to the object of study.  The second is a society-based 
approach, that asks how individuals or groups experienced these regimes and were 
transformed by them – call it the dialectic of Herrschaft and Gesellschaft, which is taken 
up below.   
 
There is a further difficulty.  Comparison and the resort to ideal types or analogs 
usually prompt atemporal categories.  They tend to posit a stable or even unchanging 
categorization, which serves us badly.  The more fruitful approach, I believe, is to look at 
inherently temporal analogues: processes of change rather than frozen structures. 
Ideological systems find it hard to sustain their revolutionary or counter-revolutionary 
energy – or, conversely, advantageous to shed it.  This process as such must be 
incorporated as a component of any ideal type.  But if so, was the system at the end still 
the same as at the beginning?   The problem of comparison is not just a question of 
identity or “likeness” across different regimes without respect to time, but an issue of 
“likeness” within nominally the same regime across time. What historical trajectory leads 
to widespread disaffiliation?   
   
These dilemmas of comparison naturally raise a third set of issues, those 
involving moral evaluation.  How bad was communist rule?   In the case of the GDR the 
implicit comparison was the Third Reich.  Was it as repressive as the Nazis, as repressive 
as old-fashioned despotism, perhaps more repressive but less sanguinary?  But how bad 
was it, too, in the 1980s vis-à-vis the 1940s or 1950s?  This dimension of inquiry has 
historiographical consequences.  History is strewn with converts:  Khrushchev made his 
early career in the province Stalin singled out for particular devastation. Janos Kadar 
presided over the post-1956 repression in Hungary, and then over the transition to   6 
“goulasch communism.”  But such transitions require practical decisions as well.  To 
what degree should participants in the communist systems have been disqualified from 
participating in the post-communist regimes?   
 
Why was power relinquished?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
When we write about l989 (and not about the appeals of Communism more 
generally), the question that was and remains so challenging was why power was 
surrendered so peacefully.  Of course, the largely peaceful transition was partially a 
question of luck and prudence.  It would not have taken much for violence to have 
intervened – a few rocks thrown by demonstrators, panic on the part of young soldiers 
and thereafter the unintended escalation of force.  Indeed in Dresden, a few days before 
the major demonstration of October 9 in Leipzig that did take place without violence, 
there had been serious clashes with police.  Moreover, some of the leaders were probably 
prepared to use coercion or arrests; consider Erich Mielke, head of the Ministry for State 
Security.  And indeed his troops did counter demonstrations in early October with mass 
arrests up to a certain point, but only to a certain point.  And if we argue that Mielke’s 
intentions were delayed and debated by Politburo colleagues or even just met by 
footdragging at the local level, we have to explain why colleagues effectively refused to 
ratify simple violence. 
 
The reason often cited is that the Soviets – who were instrumental in enforcing 
Communist rule at several key postwar junctures, Berlin in June l953, Hungary in l956, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 – made it clear that the Soviet rulers were no longer going to 
provide that support.  Under Gorbachev, after all, they were no longer going to rely on 
their potential monopoly of violence in the Baltic or at home.  When more die-hard 
Soviet leaders attempted a coup to reverse Gorbachev’s concessions, they had already let 
too much time elapse to sustain their adventurous intervention.  But the point is that in 
most of the Communist states – China and Romania excepted – the leadership was 
unwilling to shut down the process of popular protest and then negotiated power-sharing. 
Why the willingness to give way to public protests?   
 
Publication of Stasi memoranda provided some insight into this issue early on.  
They suggest that by l989 many of the leaders of the East European nations understood 
that they had arrived at a dead end in terms of their own aspirations and policies. In part 
this was a recognition of relative economic failure; in part a generational issue; in part a 
confrontation with the culture of expressive personal values (call it postmodernity) whose 
corrosive dissolution of Communist public virtues they could not withstand.   
 
Some accounts, such as Padraic Kenney’s, in fact construe the upheavals of l989 
as the triumph of a carnivalesque – a transformation scripted by Bakhtin.  Carnivalesque 
exuberance there certainly was – recall Timothy Garton Ash’s depiction of the “Magic 
Lantern” in Prague.
7  Still, in a transformation that required and elicited so many 
dimensions of psychological and ideological reorientation, it is impossible to establish 
what role the playful played alongside the serious, or music alongside prose.  Indeed that 
judgment probably depends on the historian’s own enthusiasms; I tend to think that the   7 
carnivalesque phenomena constituted more the mood music of transformation rather than 
its underlying force.  Still, popular music may perhaps be inseparable from every great 
upheaval, for music carries along the promise of a private fulfillment that only new 
public conditions will allow.  “We’ll meet again,” and even “Lily Marlene,” helped make 
tolerable the mortal separations of the Second World War; “Hey Jude” in Czech may 
have helped keep the velvet revolution velvet.    
 
We historians have perhaps paid too little systematic attention to the dialectic of 
private and public in 1989.  For if – as East European intellectuals have often claimed – 
the private seemed more poignant, and literature, for instance, more significant in a world 
of repression  (just as religious ceremonies more meaningful when they had to be held in 
secret or at least defiance),  nonetheless it was the restraints on the “private”  that made 
the arguments for public transformation so compelling.  Private longings and aspirations 
could be emancipated only by rejecting the ideological straitjacket of a system that really 
did not want to grant their legitimacy.  In that case emancipation had to bring a sense of 
trivialization.  Akhmatova, Symborska, Herbert, perhaps Woytyla hardly celebrated the 
public sphere.  Lenin supposedly said that he could not permit himself to read poetry lest 
his revolutionary commitment falter.  Leninism or latter-day communism found it hard to 
deal with any deep interiority, which represented the seductions of bourgeois culture and 
would supposedly become otiose in a collective order.  In this respect, the aesthetics and 
metaphysics of the far Left differed from those of fascism.  For fascist ideology and 
aesthetics maintained (alongside its indubitable fascination with the hardness of 
technology) a fascination with death and sacrifice that Leninism also left behind, despite 
the corpses it had found necessary to pile up.  For the nomenklatura of 1989, what was 
taking place was the return of the repressed, inexplicable not only because it had survived 
so strongly, but demoralizing because their own values had apparently taken such 
shallow root.    
 
Still, the rulers of l989 faced more than just the irrepressible claims of the private 
sphere.  It was simultaneously a looming failure in the public sphere that they had 
claimed must be the site of progress.  As Stefan Wolle put it, both by virtue of the Stasi 
documents he and Armin Mitter published in l990, “Ich liebe dich, alle…”  and in his 
general study of 1998,  Die heile Welt der Diktatur, many of the security apparatus 
believed they should be loved, and thus were shocked to find that the benevolence of 
their mission was so  repudiated.
8   The more insightful Communist leaders throughout 
East Central Europe understood that although they might continue to hold on to power by 
coercion, they could not  manage complex societies which were obviously no longer 
structured according to the binary principles the leadership had earlier presupposed.  How 
did one maintain a state of workers and peasants, when modern societies required 
teachers, managers, therapists, travel agents, clothing designers, computer programmers, 
Olympic coaches, restaurateurs, television programmers, fast food suppliers, and the 
providers of what the state called “the thousand littlel things”? 
  
After the Berlin and German treaties signed at the beginning of the l970s only the 
most stubborn and hidebound state socialist leaders, or a state security apparatus 
convinced that it still functioned as “the sword and shield” of the regime, might still   8 
believe that a commonwealth of workers and peasants was menaced by an imperialist 
conspiracy.  So, too, none but the most reactionary military leaders in Latin America or 
Iberia, or later none but the most diehard white supremacists in South Africa, could 
remain convinced that they faced a powerful communist conspiracy at home.  The 
authoritarian rulers of the l970s and l980s had already been compelled to make some 
concessions but still felt threatened by immanent and powerful subversive conspiracies 
abetted from abroad.   
 
It is worth recalling that not only Communist leaders surrendered their power; 
rightist military regimes moved toward “opening” in the same era and dismantled their 
dictatorships.  Underlying these abdications, left and right, was the growing division 
among the authoritarian rulers themselves, with a new generation sensing that they faced 
a political dead end.   Martial law could hardly ensure that workers delivered high-quality 
labor. Underlying these abdications, left and right, was the growing division among the 
authoritarian rulers themselves, as a rising generation of functionaries sensed that they 
faced a political dead end.    
 
As they contemplated relinquishing their monopoly of power, Communist 
reformers, however, did not realize how totally they would be repudiated.  Economic 
decay and the strength of dissent made persistence in forcible rule costly and unattractive; 
acceding to reforms would – so it was probably calculated – allow the holders of power 
to retain the decisive upper hand.  They set their hopes in reform of the Party cadres; but 
the history of October 1989 to the spring of 1990 shows that they badly underestimated 
the avalanche they allowed to develop and even the panic that would take hold of the 
party structures.  Whether Gorbachev’s belief that a reformed communist party might 
remain in charge of a reconfigured Soviet Union, or the Polish party’s year-long 
conviction it could dominate the Sejm, or the Krenz and even Modrow government’s 
belief they might steer a viable GDR state into a new German confederation – those who 
chose the option of peaceful reform in l989 underestimated the momentum of the currents 
that would sweep them away.  Martin Malia’s celebrated anonymous article, “To the 
Stalin Mausoleum,” made the case for the impossibility of this half-way house in Russia, 
but the argument holds for the other East European states as well.
9  
 
Herrschaft and Gesellschaft 
 
More of a continuing challenge than accounting for the downfall has been trying 
to subsume late communist regimes under an ideal type.  Most historians felt 
uncomfortable with the typologies on offer, and I believe this still remains the case.  No 
single concept – whether ”late totalitarianism” or “post-totalitarianism,” a “second 
German dictatorship” (used by Jürgen Kocka),  the “welfare dictatorship” 
(Fürsorgediktatur) proposed by Konrad Jarausch,  etc. serves entirely satisfactorily (as 
Jeannette Madarász has recently suggested in her review of the concepts.
10  When I used 
the term “late communism,” in my own account of GDR collapse, I meant really to avoid 
a generalizing model and to restrict description to the unique characteristics of the East 
European regimes in the l970s and l980s, that is to insist on the temporal dimension of 
analysis.     9 
 
The redeployment of a “totalitarian” model after l989 rested in part on specific 
German preoccupation with the role of the Stasi and an effort to render an account for the 
repression of forty years.  But it also formed part of an already decade-long international 
reaction against what was perceived as a European Left that had been too willing to make 
its peace with communist rule in Eastern Europe.  French “nouveaux philosophes” and 
United States neoconservatives exemplified the trend outside Germany.  Indeed it was 
animated by that found an equivalent outlet in the emerging American neoconservatism 
of the era.  Whether represented by historians among the so-called Verbund- SED Staat 
research group the model allowed little scope for the autonomy or agency of an East 
German public.
 11   The German formula often used in these analyses, especially when 
deployed in West German political-party battles was Unrechtsstaat, obviously meant to 
contrast with Rechtsstaat, but a designation so totalizing and vague as to be analytically 
useless.  There have been many Unrechtsstaaten in the world, ranging from personal 
despotism’s such as Charles Taylor’s in Sierra Leone or more recently Robert 
Mugabwe’s to military dictatorships, such as the Argentine generals imposed.
12  And 
even Rechtsstaaten often have enclaves where ordinary law remains suspended as in the 
United States South before the end of segregation or more recently in Guantánamo or 
Abu Ghraib.  
 
The efforts to describe the workings of society, economy, and culture under late 
socialism have been more satisfactory, I believe, than theories of political power.  Jeffrey 
Kopstein’s discussion of class, Andrew Port’s description of  how the Party manipulated 
grievances and concessions in the Saalfeld industrial zone, Corey Ross’s  study of 
socialism “at the grass roots,” in Brandenburg,  have all conveyed the texture of 
grumbling, acquiescence, accommodation and unhappiness with the Party’s feckless 
efforts to run an industrial society.  On the basis of his intense study of the Ulbricht era in 
Saalfeld,  Port has produced the most textured local study that we have, including the 
complexities of women’s role in the workplace.  He has persuasively suggested that 
precisely the grumbling of differentially privileged groups of workers with respect to 
each other precluded a unified working-class consciousness and thus helped keep the 
SED in power for so long.
 13  German studies of censorship, book production, and 
cultural self-enforcement by Manfred Jäger,  Siegfried Lokatis, Simona Barck and others 
have conveyed a good sense of the ambiguities of dissent and conformity.   As the 
controversy over Christa Wolff revealed, the texture of negotiation and restrained irony 
before l989 would allow for ample controversies and denunciations afterward.  The fine 
line trod by the Protestant Churches has stimulated a similarly differentiated description. 
 
In effect, each of these sub-systems revealed patterns of surveillance and coercive 
punishment of those who overstepped narrow bounds, but also allowable space for either 
complaining or negotiating. They could vary on how autonomous that space might be.  
Stefan Wolle’s originally rather undifferentiated treatment of GDR totalitarianism, 
Untergang auf Raten, dashed off when he was a dissident historian exiting from the GDR 
and angry at some of the softer treatments his former colleagues seemed to offer, 
produced a far more differentiated study almost a decade later.
14  Still, Wolle seems to 
have resolved the tension between regime and society by emphasizing the discrepancy   10 
between ideological project and social reality.  In almost satiric tone, he depicts the 
regime more as feckless than totalitarian and the society as corrupted rather than 
controlled – an impression created in part through the bleak photographs as well as the 
text: East Germany as a third-world dictatorship.   
 
If one sought a general social theorist whose models might accommodate this 
reality, it would probably be the late Niklas Luhmann, who sought to capture the 
complexities of modern liberal societies, but does not serve us badly in understanding the 
compartmentalization inherent in state socialism.  Luhman suggests that to try and 
discern  an overarching model or idea of substantive rationality for a social system as a 
whole (the implicit target is Jürgen Habermas)  remains a misguided search for totality.  
Instead society consists of sub-systems -- economies, communications, politics, even the 
erotic -- which have their specific logics and rules.  Ironically enough, Luhmann, the 
liberal functionalist, provides the better guide to state socialism, while the more totalizing 
concepts of either Habermas or the early Foucault remain more suggestive for liberal or 
social-democratic aspirations.
15  
 
Still, separating society from regime, Gesellschaft from Herrschaft, presents its 
own analytical perils. Overall assessment must differ according to whether one focuses 
on the regime or the society considered separately from the structures of rule. Mary 
Fulbrook’s The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker,”  
Signficantly Fulbrook’s title takes us seamlessly from state to society, although she 
intends to keep them separate spheres.  Whereas for Sttephan Wolle, “the society of the 
GDR was corrupted to its core,” (“Die Gesellschaft der DDR war bis ins Innerste 
vergiftet.,” p.152/3); for Fulbrook society remans an autonomous arena that escaped 
largely unscathed.  Fulbrook wishes “to present a coherent overview of the distinctive 
patterns and development of East German society that manages to do justice both to a 
wide range of lived experiences and to the underlying structures of which contemporaries 
may well have been unaware…This book is, thus, about the ways in which most East 
Germans lived their lives, under changing conditions, over the decades from the collapse 
of Hitler’s Third  Reich through to the collapse of the GDR…. It is “about the ways in 
which the GDR was not merely a communist state in a Cold War context, but also a 
modern industrial society facing familiar economic challenges, participating in wider 
patterns of globalization and cultural and social change…and about the ways in which it 
is not possible adequately to understand GDR history in the terms of dichotomous 
notions of regime versus people… (xii)    
 
Fulbrook claims to recognize that GDR social history was fundamentally affected 
by politics; it cannot be understood without analysis of political structures and 
processes.”  Others may disagree, but my sense is that the study in fact tends to efface the 
politicization of society:  “Faced with accounts of repression, complicity, and collusion, 
former citizens of the GDR claimed that their own memories and experiences told them 
otherwise”.  Their own biographies “did not seem to fit easily within the bleak picture of 
oppression and fear.” (p. 1)   “The SED actually wanted to do something with their 
power: to transform society into that they thought would be a better, more egalitarian, 
more just society.”(p. 9) “GDR history needs to be considered not merely from the   11 
perspective of ‘dictatorship’, or ‘communist state’, but also from that of ‘modern 
industrial society’. (11)  “Concentration of public debate on the Stasi must not shift the 
gaze that it was merely one part of the perfected scurity, displinary and surveillance 
structure.  To that belonged the party, the mass organizations, the block parties, the 
Volkspolice…”(pp.153-154) --.but these institutions hardly provided the conditions for a 
vital and autonomous social development!    
 
The view presented takes us to a central problem in the historiography of modern 
dictatorship. “Industrial society,” which Fulbrook cites as a typology that can allegedly 
transcend a cliched view of the German Democratic Republic, served indeed as an ideal 
type valuably developed by Raymond Aron and Daniel Bell in the l950s and l960s to 
overcome sterile cold-war confrontational stereotypes.  I am not certain that it provides 
the same analytical utility today.  It was a concept we can valuably invoke for the GDR 
experience through the l960s – as Andrew Port has done.  It serves us less well after the 
VIIIth Party Congress with its so-called “unity of social and economic policy,” – namely 
the commitment to a consumer society.  East Germany collapsed not because it 
functioned badly as an industrial society, but because it performed lamentably as a post-
industrial society, as Mark Landsman and Jonathan Zatlin have both recently 
demonstrated.
16   
 
But there is a deeper issue involved.   Can one study Gesellschaft without 
studying Herrschaft under conditions of dictatorship?  (Indeed to hark back to 
Tocqueveille’s Democracy in America one could not study democracy as a regime 
without understanding the society in which it was immersed.  But Tocqueville could 
presuppose that the authority system reflected the organization of society.  The central 
claim of theorists of totalitarianism, including pre-eminently Hanna Arendt’s Origins of 
Totalitarian Democracy, is that it is a regime type powerful enough to disaggregate and 
atomize society as a tool of rule primarily through the tools of terror.  .   
 
Of course this claim has been contested.  Recent discussions of Marin Broszat’s 
work on Nazi rule emphasize that his Bavaria project and efforts to “historicize” National 
Socialism were an assault on the claim of atomization.  In Broszat’s cumulative historical 
production, the regime clearly possessed uniquely terroristic capacities – but individuals 
in society might still escape relatively unscathed and non-responsible.
17  As a historian 
Broszat was wrestling with personal issues of responsibility.  Fulbrook faces no such 
problem.  But can people’s memories or beliefs that their lives were hardly circumscribed 
under dictatorship really serve as historical evidence about the nature of the system under 
which they lived?  The problem with everyday history is precisely that most people can 
go through life without feeling subjectively impinged on by politics if they make no 
effort to engage politically. But in such powerful state projects, to write a history of 
society as autonomous – or present a view of society as in Edgar Reitz’s skillful 
television series, Heimat – must lead to a partial account of the past.    
 
True enough, although the two domains of Herrschaft and Geselllschaft 
overlapped and powerfully shaped each other; they were not fused.  Enough of people’s 
family and personal lives, indeed enough of their organizational lives remained distinct to   12 
merit analysis.  This does not mean that they could always protect them.  Not all niches, 
to use Günter Gaus’s famous image, were sanctuaries: the coercive state could intrude if 
it had reason to – which is the truth on which Florian von Donnersmarck has built his 
film, The Lives of Others.  Nonetheless there was enough differentiation that each domain 
will convey a different total reality.  Describe the Communist state, and the historian 
conjures up an image of illiberal surveillance and the manipulation of fear and privilege.  
Describe the Communist society, and one can end up with a trivialization of coercive 
mechanisms.   
 
What was essential and ironic was the fact that this state really wanted the 
participation of this society.  Enlistment of the society in its project was the test of 
legitimation.  Hence, too, the importance of overwhelming election approval even when 
there was only a single party.  But the state project was not – and here I depart from 
Fulbrook – a utopian search for an egalitarian society.  Rather it became merely approval 
and acclamation in its own right.  What Clifford Geertz claimed about Negara, the theater 
state of Bali that the Dutch conquered in l906, was true in its way of late communism: the 
spectacle of rule was the objective of rule.   The goal was the non-utopian hope to have 
society constantly affirming the party’s tutelary role.  The state (or party) needed the 
society for validation; and society grew used to receiving privileges or penalties – 
Germans talk about Zukerbrot oder Prügel, cookies or knout, although under GDR 
conditions one might say Privileg oder Prügel – from the state.   
 
That is also why it is plausible to find analogies with the eighteenth century 
notion of Polizey.  Rolf Heinrich.had it correct when he pointed to the parental role of the 
state and the infantile role assigned to society.
18   Thus making a claim for what the 
Germans call Mündigkeit (maturity/ autonomy, literally the maturity to speak out) had to 
be subversive or at best negotiated so it took place within walls, such as in the Churches.  
Thus, too, the particular affinity of the Czech and East German experiences: both took 
place in societies that had developed under the auspices of ancient-régime Polizey, 
whether Prussian-Saxon, or Austrian.  Both developed patterns of risk-avoidance and 
ample denunciation – in contrast to the Polish pattern of defiance and suppression, or 
even the Hungarian experience of connivance with the state and party in evasive 
behavior.
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Facing the anniversaries of 1989, the challenge is (as it always should have been) 
is to write what might be called a “moral history,” that is one about choices.  A moral 
history cannot be one just of late Communist “experience,” for an experiential history 
will tend to document either subjectively perceived autonomy and implicitly serve 
apologia, or repeated acts of coercion, menace, or privilege.  But neither can a moral 
history just be an account of the regime either, for a regime history will find little but 
corruption, secrecy  and surveillance.  A Black Book of Communism can supply an 
indictment, but allows for little discussion of how people might in fact survive terror and 
coercion.  A moral history of late Communism must be an account of the continuing 
negotiation between collective or private action and party control and abuse.  Inhabitants 
of a territory could choose to live private lives and pay the cost of outward obedience, 
like Havel’s green-grocer with the party slogan in his window, or parents who let their   13 
children undergo the Jugendweihe.  In this case the word citizenship may be 
inappropriate.  Or inhabitants could become sincerely enthusiastic about the conspicuous 
campaigns of civic mobilization based on claims of anti-fascism or involving peace 
demonstrations.  Inhabitants could also withdraw into an oppositional silence.  Or they 
could become cynical (Sascha Anderson) or bemused (Guenter De Bruyn).  These were 
all alternatives for negotiation, not of the boundary between private and public for a firm 
boundary did not exist, but of a trading zone, a jointly occupied frontier at the spiritual 
and legal edge of the state.  A moral history need not condemn citizens for making one or 
another of these choices (at least so long as compliance did not injure others), but will 
illuminate the choices faced and the costs of each.   
    
Communist  “ageing” and the evolution of authoritarian structures.   
 
No matter how the interaction of state and society is described, essential to 
judging the communist system must be an idea of trajectory or ageing.  Most typologies 
of political systems are efforts to seek an ideal type in which there is no evolutionary 
component.  Communist systems in Eastern Europe lasted for almost a half century after 
they were established in the wake of Soviet armies.  They could evolve, but describing 
that evolution has not been easy.  And finding a typology for their later praxis has also 
proved difficult.  They were not really “post-totalitarian,” for the instruments of 
controlling media and education remained pervasive although enforced with less violence 
and harshness than during the early Cold War.  I have suggested the designation “late,” 
admittedly a vague term with intuitive (and imperfect) analogues.  The ageing process in 
humans may arrive with a new subjectivity and “ripeness,” but the individual is aware 
that he shall cease to exist, whereas those who work on behalf of an institution need feel 
no inevitable end.  Historians have studied enough regimes and systems of rule to 
understand that they can become corrupt: the central power loses control of its offices and 
its revenues, which are captured by its agents.   
 
Contemplating the state socialist regimes in the 1950s, the historian might reflect 
on the descriptions of “lateness” that critics have applied to describe individual artistic 
trajectories. Historians of Western art at least (I cannot generalize about the treatment of 
non-western art) have recognized a characteristic development of styles from initial 
simplicity to growing elaboration and complexity before they are superseded.  Theodor 
Adorno, Edward Said, and other theorists have written about “late style” as a musical or 
literary phenomenon.  Writing about the “late” Beethoven, Adorno denied that the art 
simply reflected greater subjectivity. He considered such a description a psychologizing 
view, which over-simplified what was at stake.  Instead subjectivity “took leave” of the 
work and emancipated its inherent aesthetic possibilities.
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The reader will protest: it makes no sense to press into service an aesthetic 
concept deployed to illuminate the highest expressions of human creativity and freedom 
to describe a political system dedicated so to crimpling liberty and development!  Still, it 
does seem to me that there was a Communist late style, whether akin to human ageing 
with its growing failure to control bodily processes – and with it an awareness of limited 
time -- or with aesthetic strategies.  In this case, however, the awareness of ageing did not   14 
open up a discovered potential for an artistic and luminous confrontation with finitude.  
Rather the political stratagem entailed a recourse to the cynical compromise of earlier 
ideological commitment.  In late Communist style corruption replaced commitment.  
What Adorno might have termed the possibilities inherent in the work, that is in the 
system as it had been constructed, were transformed into the accommodation of 
individualist satisfactions that were earlier supposed to be sublimated into the 
advancement of the whole. Late Communism involved a space for negotiation between 
regime and the restive citizen after earlier periods of outright coercion established what 
limits existed – that is, for the post-Stalinist era of East European Communism.  Its 
culture allowed for a certain satire, its political interactions permitted a dimension of 
knowledgeable cynicism on both sides. Youth might still be recruited, but to achieve 
maturity as an intellectual or an administrator was to become disabused.   Any adequate 
analysis of what was destroyed in 1989 must include this dimension of communist late 
style.   
 
What changed? 
 
Let us turn in conclusion, not to the interpretations of why 1989 occurred, or how best to 
describe the nature of the Communist states and societies – but what the end of that 
experiment signified.  1989, a term used as a shorthand, seems indeed to have closed a 
historical era: the short twentieth century, what Hobsbawm has called the Age of 
Extremes.  Did it close the era of great ideological conflicts as Fukuyama suggested?  Or 
did the collapse of an ideological alternative that was secular as well as authoritarian 
allow the remobilization not just of liberal democracy, but of religion as a force in public 
life.  Or did it in fact signify little?  What was perhaps most disappointing is the fact that 
the Communist system did not taint all its placeholders, that many of them seemed to 
have found if not positions of leadership, at least jobs in the new system.  To a degree this 
marked the l945 transition as well: at least in the university and judicial systems, former 
Nazis and fascists survived quite handily.  Perhaps that is the price of institutional 
renewal.  Attributing such heavy blame to “systems” that were to be transformed, made  
individual responsibilities less of a handicap.   
 
The question remains, even more urgently in 2009 than in 1989, what exactly was 
transformed?  One can envisage the history of communism in power (and fascism) as a 
major chapter in a two century struggle unleashed by economic modernization and the 
ideas of the Enlightenment.  If this is the case, then the struggle is between two visions of 
the world.  One suggests fulfillment arises from individual or even familial gain, from the 
restless effort to win more, understand more, and escape from the gravitational weight of 
tradition and community.  Liberty  and individual fulfillment are prized, equality and 
collective achievement seem less important, except perhaps in the realm of games, which 
always acts as a psychological counterweight to the discipline required by real life. But 
there is always an alternative to the mobilization of individual energy and development.  
And that is the continuing effort to validate collective and not individual fulfillment, to 
insist that destiny beckons us with a community of belonging and common action 
whether to be achieved through material equality, religious communalism or political 
authority.   Political doctrines can incorporate elements of each approach, although one   15 
principle, either the individualist or the collective, tends to prevail over the other.  The 
political Left especially in the nineteenth century was often associated with the 
mobilization of individualism, but it was also about redefining appropriate communities. 
 
Perhaps we learned the wrong lesson from l989.  We believed it constituted a 
great step forward toward the individualist mobilization of the species and a decisive 
defeat for the claims of solidarity, an oppressive solidarity in this case.  But suppose 
another lesson can be read in what has followed on l989 – namely that there can be no 
final victory for the one or the other of these tendencies, that they will always be in 
conflict, and that if one plausible remedy to give the communal its due proves illusory or 
deficient or collapses, others will rush into the gap, that, in short, there can be no end to 
this contention and co-existence of fundamental orientations – and thus no conceivable 
end to history.   
 
In that case, episodes of emancipatory exuberance must always be followed by 
efforts to reclaim the communal – by crusades to rediscipline human energies into 
disciplined orientations.  1870 followed l848 in Europe, 1933 followed 1918 in Germany, 
1980 followed l968 in the United States, and 2001 has followed l989.  I do not say this is 
the last perspective we shall have on l989: like a massive mountain that one sees first 
from a distance with a clear profile, then from close up, then perhaps from the trails along 
its slopes, where profile disappears, and finally a receeding perspective as we leave it 
behind, there will be no one view that is correct.  None of these subsequent views negate 
the extraordinary vista that then loomed up earlier.  We were privileged, if not to 
participate in, then just to witness 1989.  But it seems to me that we cannot rest with what 
we learned then, no matter how promising it appeared. 
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